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 
Abstract— Millions of devices are going to participate in 5G 
producing a huge space for security threats. The 5G specification 
goals require rigid and robust security protocol against such 
threats. Quantum cryptography is a recently emerged term in 
which we test the robustness of security protocols against 
Quantum computers. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a 
security protocol called Quantum Key GRID for Authentication 
and Key Agreement (QKG-AKA) scheme for the dynamic 
security association. This scheme is efficiently deployed in Long 
Term Evolution (LTE) architecture without any significant 
modifications in the underlying base system. The proposed QKG-
AKA mechanism is analyzed for robustness and proven safe 
against quantum computers. The simulation results and 
performance analysis show drastic improvement regarding 
security and key management over existing schemes. 
 
Index Terms— Key hierarchy, LTE/SAE, Quantum 
cryptography, Quantum Key Distribution 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ireless communication has now become an essential 
component in our day-to-day life. It is expected to rise 
by a factor of 500-1000 times in next ten years. According to 
the recent researches, the intensity of the wireless has been 
confirmed, which shows that the broadband wireless networks 
has been adopted in the improvement of education, health 
care, Industry establishment, and society enrichment [1-3]. 
The wireless broadband services that support high-speed data 
transfer helps to establish reliable communication through 
voice and video over the internet. This communication makes 
our life so simple and comfortable. Long Time Evolution 
(LTE) Technology, the primary driver of the 5G wireless 
network developed by 3rd Generation Partnership Project 
(3GPP) is a rapidly expanding global standard for the choice 
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for 5G deployments around the universe [4]. LTE is mainly 
planned to offer extended bandwidth - up to 10x for mobile 
devices, latency reduction, low maintenance and mobility 
improvement. LTE-A and evolving technologies like IoT with 
new enrichment are the vital driving force of 5G technology 
that offers essential features to support performance and cost 
optimization in IoT application. IoT with the integration of 
cellular communication will ensure extraordinary development 
in next few years for the investors and device manufacturers. 
According to GSMA research and prediction, mobile IoT 
communications are expected to hit for over 10% of the global 
market by 2020.   But as enormous devices are connected on 
wireless network and IoT, concerns are abuzz about security 
issues associated with these networks. These developments 
offer new opportunities, but the same time brings advanced 
challenging security risks for the integrity environment [5]. 
Service providers are facing more complex issues as they 
tend to grow and “future-proof” their networks to handle 
traffic, scaling capability, orchestration, cost control, security, 
etc. Though LTE is considered to be secured, the architecture 
has uncovered risks in security verticals. The security issues 
will bring the overall subscribers experience down and 
financial losses. Preserving the “key” used by the 
cryptographic algorithm is the challenging task that persists in 
the telecom industry [6-9]. Hence, security and key 
management are the critical issues for the 3GPP activity on 
LTE in IoT environment. In LTE network if the source key is 
compromised, the whole set of keys and network become 
vulnerable is accompanied by the disadvantage of substantial 
dependency on single key [11], Therefore, in LTE network, 
providing a safe communication and maintaining the Quality 
of Service (QoS) are the primary concerns. In this aspect, 
Quantum cryptography offers an absolute solution towards 
secured communication over the network by encoding 
messages as polarized photons, which can be transferred 
through the air. Quantum Computing combines two of the 
main scientific achievements of the 20th century: Information 
Theory and Quantum Mechanics. Its interdisciplinary 
character is one of the most stimulating and appealing 
attributes [13, 14]. 
Nowadays, communications and transactions seem to be 
safe as they are completely insulated by encrypting with 
complicated cryptosystems. Quantum Computing makes this 
belief false, as many of the complex crypto suits like RSA, 
Elliptic curve cryptography are demonstrated to be vulnerable 
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to quantum computers [15], [16]. Any crypto suite that was 
considered safe based on discrete log problem and integer 
factorization will be considered vulnerable against attacks 
launched using quantum computers. Not only the future 
encrypted data are unsafe, but even the information captured 
over the radio and stored, may also be highly vulnerable to a 
quantum computer. It is highly recommended for the industry 
to deploy quantum-safe algorithms so that their confidential 
information can be maintained safe.  Thus, we propose a 
simple key generation and key management scheme, which 
takes the benefits of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) as a 
seed for the key generation and provides a quantum-safe key 
hierarchy in the 5G scenario for interconnected IoT devices.  
The rest of the paper is organized as, section 2 deals with 
the survey of LTE and Quantum cryptography. In section 3, 
we present the QK-GRID generation using QKD. A key 
management solution for quantum-safe key hierarchy 
mechanisms and its components are given shortly in section 4. 
The mathematical model and the performance analysis of the 
proposed methods are conferred in section 5 and section 6 
respectively. Finally, the conclusion of the present work is 
discussed in section 7.  
II. RELATED WORKS 
The LTE network is the promising technology of this 
decade for seamless connectivity. Security is a serious concern 
in the evolving wireless networks. The security architecture of 
LTE comprises of key generation and key management 
through   a specific framework called Evolved Packet System 
Authentication and Key Agreement (EPS-AKA). Though 
EPS-AKA is good in terms of handling various security 
loopholes, a permanent security association still seems to be a 
major security flaw i.e. Single permanent key is used to derive 
all the future keys [17, 18]. Degefa [19] proposed new 
approach without any additional cost in EPS-AKA 
environment wherein, instead of fetching the authentication 
vectors from home network, fetching authentication vector 
from the foreign network is enabled to improve the overall 
performance. This method reduces the message overhead and 
authentication delay significantly. 
In LTE communication, the handover states involving a 
Home eNodeB (HeNB) is complicated, and key chaining used 
for this process is considered to lack in security. Hence, in 
order to manage the handover efficiently in HeNB, Yue [20] 
proposed a proxy signature-based handover scheme, which is 
based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography algorithm. This method 
reduces the computational cost compared with other handover 
schemes. Hassanein et al., [23] proposed a new authentication 
and key agreement protocol based on EAP-AK. This protocol 
combines Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with symmetric key 
cryptosystem to overwhelm the different types of attacks in 
EAP-AKA. This method provided perfect forward secrecy to 
improve the authentication between User Equipment (UE) and 
AAA server and between the UE/Home Subscriber Server 
(HSS). Zhao et al. [22] discussed several security issues of the 
LTE network and concluded that there are still many security 
threats exists in LTE environment[27].  
David Deutsch [24] proposed a Quantum Computing model 
which used the states of light to solve the complex problems 
by combining quantum physics and quantum mechanics. Later 
quantum computer is built and is formulated for very specific 
purposes. By the evolution of the quantum computers, many 
problems that are believed to be hard are solved in polynomial 
time and which created an awareness in the cryptography 
domain. The predominant number theory problems that pave 
the way for cryptography is discrete logarithm and integer 
factoring. These problems are widely believed to be the hard 
problem, and because of their hardness, these form the base of 
many cryptographic algorithms. Most of the asymmetric 
cryptographic algorithms and symmetric key exchange 
mechanisms, rely on these problems and their security level is 
determined based on the hardness it provides. That is, time 
and space the algorithm requires to solve this problem. Shor 
[13] devised a Quantum Computing algorithm, which solves 
this discrete logarithm and integer factorization problems in an 
unexpected time frame reduced by 2/3rd of the classical 
computer. Any conventional algorithm that fits either 
deterministic or probabilistic will take an average of n/2 
matches to find a searched element which is further reduced to 
1/4th in the quantum computer [25] 
Grover LK [26], proposed a quantum algorithm by 
adjusting the phase of various operations on superposition 
states that provide the result in less than log (√𝑁). Cryptosuits 
likes RSA and ECC are proven to be not quantum-safe as they 
cannot be employed by increasing their key size which out 
spaces the development of the quantum computer [24]. For 
example, to attack a 3072-bit RSA key, a quantum computer 
may require more than 1000 logical qubits. Though it’s 
practically difficult to build such computer, once it's 
constructed, RSA becomes bait to it. Though doubling the key 
size will make it safe, the running time of the algorithm is 
increased by the factor of 8 in a classical computer. The 
cryptographic algorithms that are safe from attack posted by 
quantum computers are referred as Quantum-Safe algorithms. 
Quantum computer made a revolution in cryptography and 
made “Quantum-Safe” algorithm, a mandate to have secure 
communication [28]. In this context, we propose a Quantum-
Safe key hierarchy and a fruitful solution (QKG-AKA) to 
solve the permanent single key association, which makes the 
LTE system safe even from the quantum computers. The 
proposed model combines the limitations of the quantum 
computer and provides a robust solution with minimal 
upgradation in the existing architecture of the LTE networks. 
QKD in LTE environment 
  As LTE is deployed globally, these services create new 
opportunities and revenues but the same time brings new 
security threats like injection, eavesdropping, content 
modification and exhaustive resource utilization. Existing 
research works in the LTE security management schemes 
focus on the multiple key management techniques, 
minimization of key distribution and cost reduction 
mechanisms. Yet, these benefits are realized for the scenario 
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3 
of the static key only, which unfortunately is accompanied by 
the disadvantage of heavy dependency on single key. To 
overcome this issue, we come up with an efficient dynamic 
key generation mechanism that uses the limitations of the 
quantum computer such as i) Knowledge of the quantum state 
is always ambiguous, ii) No-cloning principle, iii) No-deletion 
principle, and iv) No-flipping principle to increases the 
security as well as utilizes the keys efficiently. The proposed 
QK-GRID formed as result of QKD process utilizes the 
properties of quantum mechanics and provides a Quantum-
safe key hierarchy for the LTE Network from which the 
derived keys are generated and processed. 
III. PROPOSED LTE ARCHITECTURE WITH QK-GRID 
In order to prevent the confidential information during 
transmission, a security framework is required for end-to-end 
communication to ensure the LTE based IoT networks to stay 
secured. Even though LTE have multiple strong and vigorous 
cryptographic algorithms [25] still there is a need for 
improvement, especially in the Key Hierarchy. Subsequently, 
many research and efforts have been made to find new reliable 
cryptographic methods. One of these findings has led to the 
improvement of quantum cryptography, whose security trusts 
not on expectations about computer power, but on the laws of 
quantum physics [21, 30]. Though many quantum 
cryptographic methods have been offered, a perfect secrecy in 
key distribution mechanism named Quantum Key 
Distribution-using quantum physics phenomena is well 
experimented and analyzed [28].  
As shown in Fig. 1, the proposed work in LTE/SAE 
environment comprises four main components: E-UTRAN, 
UE, EPC and USIM/AuC. The E-UTRAN is responsible for 
entire radio management in LTE [25]. It consists of eNBs and 
UE, where eNB is responsible for the resource management to 
UE that comprise the IP header and encrypt the data stream. 
The EPC consists of Mobility Management Entity (MME), 
Serving GateWay (SGW), Packet Data Network Gateway 
(PDN GW), HSS and Policy and Charging Rules Function 
(PCRF). The MME is the control entity for all the control 
plane operations. SGW is used for routing and forwarding the 
packets also it performs as a local mobility entity for inter 
eNB handovers. PGW takes charge of all the IP packet based 
operations like packet inspection, IP allocation, etc. HSS is a 
global database which contains all mobile users and subscriber 
related data’s and PCRF is for policy and charging control    
Fig. 1.  LTE Architecture with QK-GRID 
Fig. 2.  Basis Types used in QK-GRID Generation 
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Fig. 3.  Qbits generation using QKD 
decision-making. In USIM/AuC, the authentication secret key 
“K” is stored in the USIM and AuC. The USIM creates entity 
authentication between the network and the user. In this 
component, our novel QK-GRID is generated by using the 
quantum key distribution channel and is used for future key 
generation. The generation of QK-GRID novel Quantum Key 
Distribution system is illustrated in the following section. 
3.1 Quantum Key GRID (QK-GRID) generation using QKD 
QKD mechanism is for secured shared key generation 
between two entities. A new quantum key GRID generation 
scheme based on QKD for safe key hierarchy and a dynamic 
security association in LTE/SAE environment has been 
proposed. This mechanism is defined by two different entities 
such as Quantum Key-Server (QK-S) and Quantum Key 
GRID (QK-GRID) for single or entangled quantum 
transmission. The QK-S is a secret key generation, 
management and exchange server using QKD protocols that 
are connected by a quantum channel to QK-GRID. The QK-
GRID acts as a seed for key generation from the LTE key 
hierarchy. If the QK-S wishes to establish a secret key with 
QK-GRID, it begins with the principle of quantum physics for 
unconditional security [16]. First, the QK-S sends a set of 
random bits to QK-GRID which are selected from the two 
states namely Basis Type (R) and Basis Type (S) that uses the 
photon polarization based on rectangular and diagonal as 
Evolved Packet Core
EPC
Evolved UTRAN
E-UTRAN
PDN
MME
Serving Gateway
PDN Gateway
PCR
eNB
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QK-GRID
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4 
shown in Fig. 2. Light contains particles called photons which 
brings electromagnetic energy and intrinsic angular 
momentum that directs its polarization properties. The 
polarization of the light is taken by the way photons spin. In 
the formation of QK-GRID, we considered two basis type 
named R and S. In R Basis Type, we state a binary 0 as a 
polarization of 0 degree and 1 as 90 degree. Likewise, a binary 
1 can be 135 degree and 0 as 45 degree polarization in the S 
Basis Type. A single photon will be polarized with four 
different positions: horizontal h, vertical v, left side polarized 
lp, and right side polarized rp. Hence, bits can be generated 
from any one of the two-basis type signified by polarizing the 
photon.  
The following phases shown in fig. 3 explains the process 
of QKD in the QK-GRID construction. In the first phase, QK-
S and QK-GRID setup a quantum channel for key distribution 
and in the second phase, using the classical channel shared 
secret key will be recovered as discussed below. 
A. Phase 1 - Quantum communication 
In the first phase, QK-S generates a random bit (0 or 1) and 
chooses a Basis Type R or S, for encoding the bit. QK-S sends 
a polarized photon for each bit over the Quantum channel to 
QK-GRID. Upon receiving the photon, the QK-GRID will 
randomly choose a Basis Type and generates a random bit. 
After receiving the qubits, QK-GRID communicates its Basis 
Type of selection to QK-S. QK-S responds back, finding in 
which Basis Type agreed with QK-GRID’s basis. If they use 
different Basis Type, the measurement results are eliminated 
and only if the measurement is correct, it is considered as 
perfect transmission. While Phase I focuses on Basis Type 
generation, in Phase II QK-GRID will broadcast the basis of 
measurement.  
B. Phase II - Public discussion 
In the second phase, the QK-GRID will report to QK-S 
about the choice of basis type for each bit and the QK-GRID 
will notify back whether it made the same choice or not over a 
traditional insecure public channel. In this point, if a QK-
GRID measure different photon, the QK-S and QK-GRID will 
reject the bits belonging to the particular photons with 50% 
probability. If no errors occurred or no manipulations 
happened in the photon, QK-S and QK-GRID confirm that 
both have an identical string of bits which is known as a sifted 
key. Information reconciliation is used to calculate the error 
rate and disclose the occurrence of snooping. The error rate 
can be calculated in many sources like environmental noise, 
non-idealities in equipment and eavesdroppers, etc., which can 
mismatch the keys of QK-S and QK-GRID. Eavesdroppers 
can collect only partial information through the quantum 
channel and on the public channel during the information 
reconciliation process. The knowledge of eavesdroppers can 
be reduced by the use of universal hash functions that have 
randomly chosen a value from a public set of functions [18]. 
As given in Fig. 3, the QK-GRID selects the right basis type, 
then it will measure the exact photon. If it picks the wrong 
basis type, then the result will be mismatched. Hence, the ideal 
efficiency of this selection mechanism is 50%.  
3.2 Formal operation of Quantum Key –GRID (QK-GRID) 
generation. 
The formal procedure of the QKG-AKA mechanism for 
layout preparation to create the QK-GRID is represented in 
Algorithm 1. The conditions for the layout construction are as 
follows, i) outline of the grid is a nxn matrix and n should be 
odd always, ii) randomly φ value should be placed on the 
constructed layout, iii) each row and column should not have 
more than one φ value and iv) each column has at most one 
mirror and is varied by the bit size it holds. 
    Algorithm 1:  QK- GRID Layout Construction 
    Input: Variable bit layout, Null values 
    Output: QK-GRID as a table 
    1: Start QK-GRID Layout Construction 
    2: Initiate 'nxn' matrix as GRID Layout // n should be odd 
    3: Setup GRID as variable bit columns  
    4: for 'i'th column  
                      (2^3*i) sets the Storage capacity of       
                                   the column 
    5:     for each column do  
    6:          null (φ) value placement 
    7:      endfor 
    8:       for each row do  
    9:           if (position != NULL) 
    10:            set position = QK_Key(column_Size) 
    11:         endif 
    12:      endfor   
    13: endfor  
    14: Stop GRID formation 
    15: Stop QK-GRID Layout Construction 
 
    Algorithm 2:  QK- GRID Generation 
    Input: Quantum key, QK-GRID Layout 
    Output: QK-GRID with binaries 
 1: Start QK-GRID Generation  
 2: Start Quantum exchange phase 
 3: Initiate QK-S  
 4: Select [rand(0,1), rand(R,S)] 
 5: Send [rand(0,1), rand(R,S)], 
                   rand(photon_sequence) to QK-  GRID 
  6:  In QK-GRID, select rand(R,S)  
  7:  If (QK-S_rand(R,S) == QK-GRID_rand(R,S)) 
  8:              Then establish_channel end if 
  9:  Stop Quantum exchange phase 
 10: Start   Public discussion phase  
 11: QK-S, Send (rand(0,1)) for selected R, S   
                                               to QK-GRID 
 12:    QK-GRID, Send (rand(0,1)) for selected R, S  
                                               to QK-S 
  13:  If (QK-S_rand (0,1) == QK-GRID_rand(0,1)) 
  14:                 Then start connection end if 
  15: Stop Public discussion phase 
  16: Start Binaries_Fetch 
  17:    Send Binaries to QK-GRID 
  18:   Receive Binaries from QK-S 
  19: Stop Binaries_Fetch 
  20: Flood Binaries  
  21: Stop QK-GRID Generation 
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5 
After the layout construction, the values inside the QK-
GRID are filled up using QKD process. The generation of 
QK-Grid values through all the three phases, Quantum 
exchange, Public discussion and shared secret key are 
represented in Algorithm 2.  
Initially, the QK-S and QK-GRID establish a connection 
between them by randomly choosing the Basis Type and bits. 
3.2.1 Eavesdropper detection 
 For instance, if an eavesdropper is trying to intercept the 
transmissions from QK-S, it randomly picks qubits based on 
measurement and retransmits it. 50% of the time adversary 
would be correct since he does not aware of the Basis Type 
what QK-S transmitted in and 50% of the time QK-S and QK-
GRID are correct when they are retransmitting and measuring 
the bits. During the sifted key process, the combination of 
these will present 25% error. Hence, if QK-S and QK-GRID 
detect an error rate of 25% or higher in sifted key, they 
conclude that there is an eavesdropper present and weaken the 
key exchange process. By this way QK-S and QK-GRID 
always detect the existence of an eavesdropper. Thus, QKG-
AKA provides a protective shield against various attacks. 
IV. KEY MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS 
Typically, data encryption is used for data confidentiality, 
in order to comply with industry regulations. There are 
multiple options generally used for generating an encryption 
key, from open source and vendor provided solutions. Once an 
encryption key is generated and leveraged for encrypting data, 
the symmetric key has to be stored for decryption. The prime 
issue that seeks attention is the place where we store the 
generated key and the environment where it is stored. One of 
the popular approaches is to use a key hierarchy [6] that 
simplifies the way to organize encryption keys. Also, the key 
hierarchy gives a pattern for storing cryptographic keys. It 
further allows you to derive varying keys that are required for 
maintaining confidentiality and integrity. Point to be noted is 
that a master key which is used as a seed for all the derivatives 
has the power to decrypt all other keys, thereby indirectly all 
other data. So, protection of master key becomes important; 
but it is also important that the master key is accessible for 
decryption. It is highly complex to balance both the 
availability and protection of master key. 
To overcome such a static and single key issue, here a key 
hierarchy mechanism is proposed. We took a permanent PSA 
as Previous Key (Pre-K) and a Quantum based key generation 
component QK-GRID. The QK-GRID is formed of bits that 
are obtained through a specially designed Quantum based key 
distributor. This QK-GRID act as a source key material to 
fetch keys that are needed to make the primary Key LTE K a 
dynamic and a promising key for all communications. 
As shown in Fig. 4, the new key hierarchy of security keys 
used and the relationship among these security keys are 
summarized as follows: 
UE/ eNB
UE/ MME
UE/ HSS
USIM/ AuC
QK-GRID Pre-K
K
CK,IK
KASME
KNASenc KNASint
KeNB/NH
KUPint KUPenc KRRCint KRRCenc
 
Fig. 4 Proposed LTE Key hierarchy with QK-GRID 
• QK-GRID is a table of binaries obtained as a result of 
QKD process. The main focus of QK-GRID is for primary 
key establishment and authentication dynamically. Pre-K 
is the previously used ‘K’ for all the key generations. 
• The master secret key “K” for mobile communication 
(GSM/EPS) which is stored permanently in USIM and 
AuC (Authentication Centre) node. “K” is a pre-shared 
secret for Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) 
between the AuC and USIM. 
 CK, IK – a pair of keys for confidentiality and integrity.  
 
They are derived and passed from USIM to UE and AuC to 
HSS during AKC process. 
• KASME – is an intermediate key generated by UE and HSS 
using keys CK and IK.  
• KNASenc, KNASint – Encryption and integrity protection 
generated from KASME derived in UE/MME. 
• KeNB – Intermediate key generated by MME/UE from 
KASME.  
• NH is an intermediate key derived by UE/eNB which 
provides forward security. 
 
The authentication and key management scheme using QK-
GRID is named as QKG-AKA. The QK-GRID is a table that 
holds variable sized bits across the rows and columns. These 
bits are initially formed as the result of QKD process. When a 
user is joining a network, this QK-GRID is formed and is set 
up based on steps mentioned in Algorithm 1. 
 
QK-GRID is a randomly generated table for users, and need 
not be unique for each user. The primary key for the LTE is 
derived from the QK-GRID as shown in Fig. 5. This key is 
fetched from two components - (1) QK-GRID and (2) Pre-K 
feedback from past used key K. It is pre-installed for the first 
run, with a random 256 bits, and for subsequent runs it will 
use previously used K and in future it will be placed as Pre-K, 
thereby holding a two-stage security, since key is fetched from 
two different sources as presented in the Fig. 5. In addition, 
many manipulation operations are done before obtaining the 
next key K. The generated LTE master key should be agreed  
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Fig. 5 Generating LTE key through QGK Process 
by all the authenticated subscribers and further keys can be 
generated from this LTE master key to protect users from 
various interfaces and network. Thus, by adopting QKG-
AKA, the static single key permanent association is avoided 
and dynamic key generation is supported by using QK-GRID. 
Also, QKG-AKA promises forward and backward secrecy 
because of QKD and using a feedback circuit for Pre- Key. 
With the integration of QKD process, QKG-AKA promises a 
secure key management and GRID formation [6] delivers a 
quantum-safe key derivation seed. 
V. MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, we propose an analytic model to investigate 
the lifetime of the key as it is the seed for all the derivatives. 
The parameters used in this analytical model are presented in 
the Table 1. Let σ, τ and λR be the expiration rate of the key in 
a particular QK-GRID session, the mean value of its 
expiration time and the refreshing rate in the dynamic session 
respectively. The key expiration time te is independent and 
identically distributed random variables with Cumulative 
Distribution Function (CDF) as Fe(te) and Probability 
Distribution Function (PDF) as fe(te). 
For this, the laplace transform will be  
  𝑓𝑒
∗(𝑠) = ∫ 𝑒−𝑠𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
𝑓𝑒 (𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
 
TABLE I 
LIST OF PARAMETERS 
Description Parameter 
The expected key arrival rate λ 
Key expiration time te 
The expected value of te Τ 
PDF of te fe(te) 
CDF of te Fe(te) 
Laplace transform of te fe*(s) 
Refreshing rate λR 
Time interval between refreshing 
operation  
tR 
Re-use probability P 
Key discontinuation rate φ 
The time interval between the key enters into the expiration 
period and the time when the first refreshing operation occurs 
will be denoted as tr. Then the probability that atleast single 
static key generation happens in the expiration period of the 
key is p. Therefore 
                          p = P(te >  tr) = 1 - P(te ≤ tr)            (1) 
The probability that no key generation happens within the 
expiration period te is given as  
 
                    P(te ≤ tr)  = ∫ 𝑃{𝑡𝑒  ≤  𝑡𝑟 |𝑡𝑟 = 𝑡} 𝑓𝑟(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
 
                                   = ∫ 𝑃{𝑡𝑒  ≤  𝑡 |𝑡𝑟 = 𝑡} 𝑓𝑟(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
  
                                   = ∫ 𝑃{𝑡𝑒  ≤ 𝑡} 𝑓𝑟(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
 
                                   = ∫ 𝐹𝑒(𝑡) 𝑓𝑟(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
 
                P(te ≤ tr) = ∫ ∫ 𝑓𝑒(𝑡𝑒) 𝑓𝑟(𝑡)𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡
𝑡
𝑡𝑒=0
∞
𝑡=0
           (2) 
Using Excess Life Theorem in [29], [30] fr(t) is the PDF 
and can be written as  
                          𝑓
𝑟
(𝑡) =  𝜆𝑅   ∫ 𝑓𝑅(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
∞
𝑠=𝑡
 
                                = 𝜆𝑅[1 − 𝐹𝑅(𝑡)]                                (3) 
 In the dynamic key generation algorithm, the refreshing rate 
λR can be expressed as  
                                  𝜆𝑅 = √
𝜆
2φ𝑡ℎ
 
  The PDF of this refreshing operation is given by 
𝑝(𝑚) =
1
Ts
√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
,𝑚 𝜖 𝑁0, 𝑚 𝜖 [0, ⌊𝑇𝑠
𝜆
2φ𝑡ℎ
⌋] 
The CDF is given as  
 
      𝐹𝑅(𝑡) = 
{
 
 
𝑚
TS
√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
, 𝑚√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
≤ 𝑡 < (𝑚 + 1)√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
   
      1, (𝑚 + 1)√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
 ≤  𝑡 ≤  𝑇𝑆
         (4) 
          
 Combining (3) and (4), (2) is written as 
  
                𝑃{𝑡𝑒 ≤ 𝑡𝑟} =  ∫ ∫ 𝑓𝑒
𝑡𝑟
𝑡𝑒=0
√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
𝑡𝑟=0
(𝑡𝑒)𝑓𝑟(𝑡𝑟)𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡𝑟 
Thus (refresh time interval ≥ tr)   
= ∫ ∫ 𝑓𝑒
𝑡𝑟
𝑡𝑒=0
√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
𝑡𝑟=0
(𝑡𝑒)𝜆𝑅 [1 − 𝐹𝑅(𝑡𝑟)] 𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡𝑟 
= ∫ ∫ 𝑓𝑒
√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
𝑡𝑟=𝑡𝑒
√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
𝑡𝑒=0
(𝑡𝑒)𝜆𝑅 [1 − 𝐹𝑅(𝑡𝑟)] 𝑑𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑡𝑒 
= ∫ ∫ 𝑓𝑒
√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
𝑡𝑟=𝑡𝑒
√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
𝑡𝑒=0
(𝑡𝑒)𝜆𝑅𝑑𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑡𝑒 
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By (4),    
𝐹𝑟(𝑡𝑟) = 0, 𝑖𝑓 0 ≤  𝑡𝑟 ≤ √
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
  
=∫ 𝜆𝑅
√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
𝑡𝑒=0
𝑓𝑒(𝑡𝑒) (√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
− 𝑡𝑒)𝑑𝑡𝑒 
             = 𝜆𝑅√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
∫ 𝑓𝑒(𝑡𝑒)𝑑𝑡𝑒
√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
𝑡𝑒=0
− 𝜆𝑅∫ 𝑓𝑒(𝑡𝑒)𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡𝑒
√2φth
𝜆
𝑡𝑒=0
 
    = 𝐹𝑒 (√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
) − 𝐹𝑒 (√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
) + 𝜆𝑅 ∫ 𝐹𝑒(𝑡𝑒)𝑑𝑡𝑒
√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
𝑡𝑒=0
 
                 = √
𝜆
2φ𝑡ℎ
∫ 𝐹𝑒(𝑡𝑒)𝑑𝑡𝑒
√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
𝑡𝑒=0
 
(1) becomes, 
                   𝑃𝐷𝐾𝐺𝐴 =  1 − √
𝜆
2φ𝑡ℎ
∫ 𝐹𝑒(𝑡𝑒)𝑑𝑡𝑒
√
2φ𝑡ℎ
𝜆
𝑡𝑒=0
                   (5) 
This analytical model offers several benefits such as 
it is helpful in determining the key refresh-time for the 
specified scenarios, determining the type of key generation for 
specific requirements and the probability of dynamic key 
generation time under various constraints respectively. Also, it 
is recommended for the system to have a long key refresh time 
as the keys are very secure and can be used for a prolonged 
time to generate further keys using any key generation 
algorithms. By this model, it is possible to track the scenario 
where QKG-AKA can provide rigid security and adaptable to 
key generation. Through this analysis, we infer that 
deterministic algorithms cannot break the key hierarchy in 
polynomial time. 
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
The proposed system was experimentally tested using five 
different servers running Ubuntu and windows. The 
experimental setups include the Quantum Key distributor as a 
program containing 12,987 unique key sets in a Core i3 
machine and terminal nodes configured as UE in 3 different 
Core-i5 PC’s running on a 2.50 GHz Intel ® Core™ i5-
3120M Processor and 8 GB RAM. With this setup, the 
security and performance of the proposed mechanism is 
analyzed to estimate the computation and key generation time. 
The time taken for generating 256 bits through QKG 
(Quantum Key Generation) process is shown in Fig. 6. This 
proves the time taken for the normal key generation and QKG 
process are similar when they are used conversely with KDF 
& random function. This paves the way to adopt a QKG 
process to the places where a Complex KDF is used to 
generate a key. The authentication time taken for HSS and 
MME is analyzed and plotted in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8. The 
authentication time of various techniques such as QKG-AKA, 
SE-AKA[31] and EPS-AKA[32] and parameters have been 
compared with our mechanism. The X-axis represents the 
number of authentication and Y-axis signifies the elapsed time 
(seconds) of various mechanisms. The result clearly shows 
that the elapsed time of QKG-AKA mechanism is reduced 
when compared with other techniques without any security 
negotiations. From the QK-GRID, the number of unique keys 
generated is shown in the Fig. 9. We infer from the plot that 
the number of unique keys increases with the size of the QK-
GRID. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Time taken for 256 bits Key generation by QKG 
process 
 
Fig. 7 Authentication load at HSS  
 
Fig. 8 Authentication load at MME 
 
Fig. 9 Number of unique keys found for QK-GRID 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The transmission medium is vulnerable to attacks due to its 
broadcasting nature and the features of the radio propagation 
1551-3203 (c) 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2019.2949354, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
> TII – 19- 1769 < 
 
8 
channels. In the 5G era, it is expected that billions of devices 
are going be connected to the Internet and the backbone 
network is believed to be LTE-A network. Though technology 
development provides comfort, it also paves the ways for 
intruders. Attacks like jamming, privacy theft, eavesdropping 
etc., are threatening the evolving technologies. These attacks 
on the LTE-A network invites fruitful solutions to protect the 
network from adversaries. One of the predominant issues that 
seek immediate attention is the limitation in the authentication 
process and permanent security association. This has been 
resolved here by a secure framework, QKG-AKA using 
dynamic key hierarchy and quantum information. In this 
paper, we proposed QK-GRID based on QKD to overcome 
single static security association through a reliable key 
management process, with minimal architectural changes in 
LTE / SAE security architecture. The performance of the 
QKG-AKA has been tested with various parameters and found 
to be secure in all the attacker models. The analytical model of 
the proposed key hierarchy ensures that the probability of the 
hacking the system in polynomial time is not possible. We 
infer a twofold improvement in the security of the key 
hierarchy when it is deployed with QKD. The future work of 
this article is to extend the QK-GRID of the QKG-AKA to 
provide security for the Internet of Vehicles domain for a safe 
and smart transportation system. 
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